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The Money Laundering Control Act of
1986: Tainted Money and the Criminal
Defense Lawyer
Congress views organized crime, drug trafficking, and racketeering
as types of criminal activity that threaten the welfare of the nation.1
Several federal statutes have been enacted in response to the criminal
activity. 2 As efforts to control these activities intensify, other legiti-
mate activities are affected. The Money Laundering Control Act of
1986 [hereinafer the Control Act] illustrates this problem.3 The Con-
trol Act is an attempt to control criminal activity by monitoring
money derived from crime.4 One provision of the Control Act is
broad enough, however, to reach criminal defense lawyers performing
constitutionally protected functions.5
1. See generally Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 1986 U.S. CODE
CoNGa. & ADMmN. NEws (100 Stat.) (purpose of Act is to encourage cooperation among foreign
governments to aid in eradicating foreign drug crops and to halt international drug trafficking
by improving enforcement of drug laws and enhancing interdiction of drug shipments); United
States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp 715, 720 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (purpose behind Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) legislation is to enhance the means of preventing
money and power derived from syndicated gambling, loan sharking, theft and fencing of
property, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of exploitation from corrupting business and
democratic processes).
2. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmuN. NEws (100 Stat.).
3. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-1367, 1986
U.S. CODE CONO. & AD)m;. NEws (100 Stat.) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 1956,
1957; 31 U.S.C. § 5324).
4. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956, 1957 (West Supp. 1987); 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (West Supp.
1987). See generally 132 CONG. REc. S9626 (daily ed. July 24, 1986) (statement by Senator
Thurmond). The purpose of money laundering bill is to increase the authority of enforcement
officials to prosecute members of organized criminal groups and drug traffickers who reap
profits from illegal activity. Id.
5. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (West Supp. 1987). ("Whoever" may be broad enough to
include defense attorneys). See infra text accompanying notes 96-134 (discussing possible
constitutional infirmities of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (1987)).
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Money laundering is a technique of converting large amounts of
cash derived from illegal activities into a disguised form that is
spendable or consumable.6 Money laundering has become a lucrative
and sophisticated business and is a widespread problem within the
United States. 7 Until 1970, money laundering activities were neither
controlled nor prohibited by statute or common law because money
laundering was viewed as being only incidental to true criminal
activities." In an effort to detect money laundering activity, Congress
enacted the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. 9 More recently, Congress has
strengthened the Bank Secrecy Act by enacting the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986.10
The Bank Secrecy Act requires financial institutions to file reports
with the federal government any time a person conducts a large cash
transaction." This reporting requirement has had only marginal effect
in controlling money laundering, however, because the statute only
applies to financial institutions. Individuals have been able to circum-
6. See generally Comment, Piercing Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to Launder Illegal
Narcotics Profits: The Cayman Islands Example, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 133, 136-37 (1985). A
common method of money laundering was to channel cash through businesses created to give
legitimacy to illegal profits. The Internal Revenue Service has established controls to detect
such businesses, however, and the money launderer has had to develop new techniques. Id. at
737.
7. See Money Laundering, Bus. Wic., Mar. 18, 1985, at 74, 76. Money launderers
typically earn a three percent commission. One money launderer washed $240 million through
a Miami bank in eight months. Id.
8. See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 38 (1974). See H.R. REP.
No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADMIN. NEws 4394,
4396, which states in part:
Criminals deal in money-cash or its equivalent. The deposit and withdrawal of
large amounts of currency or its equivalent (monetary instruments) under unusual
circumstances may betray a criminal activity. The money in many of these transac-
tions may represent anything from the proceeds of a lottery racket to money for
the bribery of public officials.
Id.
9. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84
Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5311-5323 (West 1983)).
10. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-1367, 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws (100 Stat.) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 1956,
1957; 31 U.S.C. § 5324).
11. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5313 (West 1983); 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1986) (transactions involving
more than $10,000 in currency require a report to be filed); see infra text accompanying notes
28-43. A new provision of the Internal Revenue Code, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
provides in part:
RETURNS RELATING TO CASH RECEIVED IN TRADE OR BUSINESS
(a) CASH RECEIPTS OF MORE THAN $10,000. Any person -
(1) who is engaged in a trade or business, and
(2) who, in the course of such trade or business, received more than $10,000 in cash
in 1 transaction (or 2 or more related transactions), shall make the return described
in subsection (b) with respect to such transaction .
26 U.S.C.A. § 60501 -(West Supp. 1987).
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vent the law by structuring their transactions so that financial insti-
tutions would not be required to file a report.12 The transactions
would go undetected and the individual would escape liability.
Because reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act explicitly
apply only to financial institutions, 13 and not to individuals, govern-
ment attorneys and courts alike struggled to find other theories of
liability to use against individuals. Federal appellate courts were
unable to agree on a single theory of criminal liability for individu-
als.' 4 Three federal courts of appeals upheld criminal convictions of
individuals who structured transactions to evade reporting require-
ments, while two other federal courts of appeals ruled that individuals
who structure transactions had committed no crime. 5
To alleviate the inconsistency in the courts, Congress passed the
Control Act.' 6 The Control Act creates several substantive money
laundering offenses. 17 Most significantly, the new statute attempts to
fill the gaps left by the Bank Secrecy Act relating to individuals by
imposing a reporting duty upon the individual customer of a financial
institution. 5 Under the Control Act, transactions structured to avoid
filing requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act are now criminal. 19 While
12. Individuals typically "structure" transactions by engaging in cash transactions of less
than $10,000 at several financial institutions to avoid the reporting requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act. See, e.g., United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986) (purchase
of cashier's checks in amounts under $10,000 to avoid the reporting requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act).
13. The Bank Secrecy Act provides in pertinent part: "[t]he institution and any other
participant in the transaction that the Secretary shall prescribe shall file a report on the
transaction." 31 U.S.C.A. § 5313 (West 1983). See infra text accompanying notes 38-43
(discussing the failure to mention individuals in the regulations). See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312(a)(2)(A)-
(U) (Vest 1983 & Supp. 1987) (definition of financial institution). See also 31 C.F.R. § 103.110
(1986) (including casinos as financial institutions).
14. Compare United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311, 1315 (10th Cir. 1984) and United
States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627, 633 (lth Cir. 1984) and United States v. Tobon-Builles, 706
F.2d 1092, 1101 (11th Cir. 1983) and United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (5th
Cir. 1979) (individuals held criminally liable for money laundering activities) with United States
v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676,
682 (Ist Cir. 1985) (individuals not held criminally liable).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 44-71.
16. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351, 1352, 1354,
1366, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981,
1956, 1957; 31 U.S.C. § 5324).
17. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956, 1957 (West Supp. 1987) (creating a criminal offense
for knowingly engaging in a money laundering transaction and a criminal offense for knowingly
engaging in a transaction in criminally derived property).
18. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (Vest Supp. 1987). A person is prohibited under the new
law from causing a financial insititution to not file a report, or to file a report that contains
a material omission. Id.
19. See id.
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the Control Act addresses the problem of individual money launder-
ers, the new legislation may be too broad.20
The Control Act may exceed the intended purpose of the legisla-
tion. 2' Criminal defense lawyers may be subject to prosecution under
the Control Act, thus restricting the sixth amendment right of the
accused to retain counsel of choice.2 In addition, the new laws
threaten the independence of the criminal defense bar, upsetting the
balance achieved under an adversarial system. 23
Initially, this comment will outline the requirements imposed by
the Bank Secrecy Act, focusing on the reporting requirements for
domestic currency transactions and the penalties for failure to re-
port.24 Next, this comment will review the efforts made by courts to
extend application of the Bank Secrecy Act to individuals. 25 This
comment will then analyze the new legislation on money laundering. 26
Finally, this comment will consider possible problems created by the
new legislation, concluding that the Control Act be amended to
accommodate both the interest in prohibiting money laundering and
the sixth amendment rights of the accused.27
THE BANK SEc ECY ACT
The problem of money laundering was first addressed by Congress
with the enactment of the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970.2 At the time
of enactment, Congress was concerned primarily with the improprie-
ties involving foreign banks and foreign currency transactions. 29 The
20. See infra text accompanying notes 98-139 (discussing potential constitutional problems
of the Control Act).
21. See generally 132 CONG. REc. S9626 (daily ed. July 24, 1986) (statement by Senator
Thurmond) (purpose of money laundering bill is to increase the authority of enforcement
officials to prosecute members of organized criminal groups and drug traffickers who reap
profits from illegal activity).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 110-24.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 125-39.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 28-43.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 44-71.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 72-97.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 98-142.
28. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84
Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5323 (1983)).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CoNO. &
Armw. N-ws 4394, 4397. The report states in pertinent part:
Secret bank accounts and secret foreign financial institutions have permitted prolif-
eration of "white collar" crime; have served as the financial underpinning of
organized criminal operations in the United States; have been utilized by Americans
to evade income taxes, conceal assets illegally and purchase gold; have allowed
Americans and others to avoid the law and regulations governing securities and
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stated purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act is "to require certain reports
or records where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal,
tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings." 30
A. Domestic Reporting Requirements
The domestic reporting provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act require
that reports on monetary transactions be filed by domestic financial
institutions as designated by regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of Treasury [hereinafter the Secretary]31 The Secretary has issued
regulations requiring reports of transactions in currency of more than
$10,000.32 Financial institutions that are subject to the reporting
requirements include banks, brokers, and casinos. 33 Penalties are
provided for failure to comply with these provisions.
exchanges; have served as essential ingredients in frauds including schemes to defraud
the United States; have served as the ultimate depository of black market proceeds
from Vietnam; have served as a source of questionable financing for conglomerate
and other corporate stock acquisitions, mergers and takeovers; have covered con-
spiracies to steal from the U.S. defense and foreign aid funds; and have served as
the cleansing agent for "hot" or illegally obtained monies.
Id.
30. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5311 (West 1983). See also California Bankers Ass'n v Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 38 (1974) (in passing the Bank Secrecy Act, Congress recognized the usefulness of
transaction reports in investigating criminal activity).
31. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5313(a) (West 1983). Records are also required in connection with
foreign financial agency transactions and foreign currency transactions. Id. §§ 5314-5315 (West
1983). In addition, reports are required to be filed with the Secretary of Treasury when a
person knowingly imports or exports a monetary instrument with a value of more than $10,000.
Id. § 5316(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987). The Bank Secrecy Act has no legal effect without
implementing regulations by the Secretary of Treasury. Id. §§ 5313-5315 (West 1983). See
generally California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). The Shultz court upheld the
constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act. The fourth amendment right to be free of unlawful
search and seizure is not violated by the Act's reporting requirements because the financial
institution records are not being searched or seized. Also, the records of the depositor are not
being examined by the government since the bank is not an agent of the state. Id. at 52-67.
In addition, the Shultz court held that the Bank Secrecy Act does not violate the fifth
amendment right to due process and protection against self-incrimination as applied to financial
institutions. Banks, as corporations, do not enjoy fifth amendment rights and do not have
standing to assert those rights on behalf of their customers. Id. at 71-75. Prior to the Bank
Secrecy Act, financial institutions provided reports of the large currency transactions of their
customers pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Treasury. 31 C.F.R. §
102.1 (1949) (repealed 1972). This regulation was promulgated under authority given the
Secretary of Treasury by the Energy Act, 40 Stat. 411 (1933) and the First War Powers Act,
55 Stat. 839 (1941).
32. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1986). Reports are not required for transactions with the Federal
Reserve Banks or Federal Home Loan banks. Moreover, reports are not required for trans-
actions between domestic banks, or between nonbank financial institutions and commercial
banks. Id. § 103.22(b)(1) (1986). "Currency" is defined as the coin and currency of the United
States or any other country. Id. § 103.11(c) (1986). "Transactions in currency" means the
physical transfer of currency from one person to another. Id. § 103.11(e).
33. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(e) (1986). The regulations also define "financial institution" to
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B. Penalties
The Bank Secrecy Act provides both civil and criminal penalties
for failure to report currency transactions.34 A financial institution
may also be liable for negligence if requirements are not followed. 5
In addition, the currency involved in certain transactions that violate
the Bank Secrecy Act is subject to forfeiture.3 6 Rewards are available
for information leading to a criminal fine, civil penalty, or forfei-
ture.37
C. Persons Subject to the Bank Secrecy Act
The Bank Secrecy Act did not limit the reporting requirements and
applicable penalties for failure to report exclusively to financial
institutions. 38 Rather, the Bank Secrecy Act authorized the Secretary
to require both an institution and any other participant in the
transaction to file a Currency Transaction Report (CTR).39 The
regulations, however, do not require that any other participant, other
include "persons or entities doing business within the United States as a. . . dealer in securities,
a currency exchange, a transmitter of funds, ... one engaged in selling travelers checks,
money orders or similar instruments." Id. Financial institutions are not required to file reports
in connection with certain legitimate cash transactions. Id. § 103.22(e).
34. See 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5321-5322 (West Supp. 1987). The greater of $25,000, or the
amount involved in the transaction, may be imposed as a civil money penalty for violation of
the reporting requirements. Id. § 5321(a)(1). Civil penalties may be imposed on any domestic
financial institution, partner, director, officer, or employee of a domestic financial institution
for willful violation of any provision of the Bank Secrecy Act or the regulations issued pursuant
to the Bank Secrecy Act. Id. § 5321 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). For financial institutions
failing to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act, each day of noncompliance is a separate offense.
Id. Criminal penalties for reporting violations include a fine of up to S250,000, 10 years
imprisonment, or both. Id. § 5322 (West Supp. 1987).
35. The penalty for negligence is limited to $500. Id. § 5321(a)(6) (West Supp. 1987).
36. Id. § 5317 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). A forfeiture penalty may also apply when no
report is filed for transporting a monetary instrument into or out of the United States. Id.
Forfeiture penalties may also apply when a financial institution does not file a report for a
transaction that requires a report. 18 U.S.C.A. § 981(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1987). If the report,
however, was not filed due to an error on the part of the financial institution, forfeiture does
not apply. Id.
37. 31 U.S.C. § 5323 (West Supp. 1987). Authorized rewards will be the lesser of $150,000
and 25% of the fine, penalty, or forfeiture. Id. § 5323(b).
38. Id. § 5313(a) (West 1983). The statute provides in pertinent part that "the institution
and any other participant in the transaction ... shall file a report on the transaction . .. ."
Id. (emphasis added). The section grants authority to determine who shall be required to file
under the Act. Id. See United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986) (only
financial institutions are required to file).
39. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5313(a) (West 1983) Cf. id. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (West Supp. 1987)
(causing a financial institution not to file a report is criminal under the Control Act).
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than the financial institution, file a CTR.40 The failure to include
individuals in the regulations has never been explained. 41 The omission
of reference to individuals in the regulations has impeded government
attempts to hold individuals criminally liable for currency transactions
structured to avoid the reporting requirements.42 Some courts, how-
ever, have held individuals engaged in money laundering activities
criminally liable despite the absence of an explicit provision. 4
GRnuNAL LABILITY UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT
A. Upholding Convictions of Individuals
Before enactment of the Control Act, courts advanced two basic
theories to impose criminal liability on individuals for domestic
money laundering transactions." Under one theory, a defendant was
charged as a principal with causing the financial institution to not
40. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1986); see also United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762
(9th Cir. 1986) (statement by the court that the Secretary has not designated that individuals
file reports).
41. See generally United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 681-82 (lst Cir. 1985) (noting
the lack of any reference to individuals and citing a discussion of the Comptroller General of
the United States criticizing the Secretary for not using full power given under the Act).
42. See Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 682 (reversing conviction of defendant charged with
structuring transactions to avoid reporting requirements).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311, 1315-16 (10th Cir. 1984) (defendant,
an individual, was held to have violated the Bank Secrecy Act by willingly and knowingly
causing a bank not to file a required report); United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627, 633 (11th
Cir. 1984) (defendants held liable for the bank's failure to file required reports); United States
v. Tobon-Builles, 706 F.2d 1092, 1100 (11th Cir. 1983) (the lack of any duty on the part of
defendant to report transactions over $10,000 does not reduce the liability of the defendant
for willfully causing the bank to fall to file a report); United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d
1200, 1202 (5th Cir. 1979) (chairman of the board of a bank held to have unlawfully caused
the bank not to file a currency transaction report).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Cook 745 F.2d 1311, 1315 (10th Cir. 1984) (violation of
the Bank Secrecy Act as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)); United States v. Tobon-Builles,
706 F.2d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 1983) (concealment of a material fact from a regulatory
agency). Other theories have been advanced in specific factual situations. See United States v.
Goldberg, 756 F.2d 949, 954 (2d Cir. 1985) (defendants who conspired to transfer large
amounts of currency out of the United States were found to be a "financial institution" under
the Bank Secrecy Act); United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1984)
(currency exchange business of defendant in Columbia that deposited money in an American
bank was found to be a "domestic financial institution"); United States v. Richter, 610 F.
Supp. 480, 486 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (defendant charged with conspiracy to defraud the United
States under 18 U.S.C. § 371, for transactions structured to avoid reporting requirements of
the Bank Secrecy Act); United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986)
(defendant who conceded that laundering activities facilitated movement of drug profits out
of the United States was found to be a "financial institution" subject to the Bank Secrecy
Act).
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report the transaction required under the Bank Secrecy Act.45 Under
the other theory, defendants were prosecuted for concealing a ma-
terial fact from the government by way of trick, scheme, or device. 46
The first theory relied on a statute under which a person is punished
as a principal for willfully causing an agent or instrumentality to
perform an act which is an indispensable element of an offense
against the United States.47 The person causing the intermediary to
commit the act legally adopts the act of the intermediary and the
capacity of the intermediary to commit the crime.48 Some federal
courts of appeal reasoned that the individual caused the financial
institution to not file a required report by deliberately structuring
currency transactions to avoid the reporting requirements.4 9 The
individual was therefore guilty of violating the Bank Secrecy Act as
a principal.
45. See generally United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311, 1315-16 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
individual criminally liable as a principal to the crime of causing a bank to not file a transaction
report by splitting transactions into sums less than $10,000).
46. See generally United States v. Tobon-Builles, 706 F.2d 1092, 1101 (11th Cir. 1983)
(upholding conviction of defendants under a concealment theory for buying a series of cashier's
checks in amounts less than $10,000 to avoid the reporting requirements).
47. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2(b) (XVest 1969). The statute provides that: "Whoever willfully causes
an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against
the United States, is punishable as a principal." Id.
48. See Cook, 745 F.2d at 1315.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 603 F.2d 1200, 1202 (5th Cir. 1979). In
Thompson, the defendant was Chairman of the Board of a bank. The bank was required to
file currency transaction reports (CTR's) under the Bank Secrecy Act. The defendant structured
a $45,000 loan for a bank customer as five, $9,000 loans in an attempt to circumvent the
reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. The court upheld the conviction of defendant
Thompson for a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. Id. at 1202. United States v. Puerto, 730
F.2d 627, 633 (11th Cir. 1984). In Puerto, the defendant conspired with bank employees to
exchange cash for cashier's checks made out to fictitious persons. The bank employees were
told to prepare CTR's using fictitious names. The employees, however, chose not to file any
CTR's. The court rejected an argument by Puerto that he was not responsible for the nonfiling
of the CTR's and found Puerto guilty of filing inaccurate reports. Id. at 633. Puerto was held
accountable as a principal for the bank's failure to file. The court in Puerto also applied the
concealment theory as well as a conspiracy theory in upholding the defendant's conviction.
Id. at 633. United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311, 1315 (10th Cir. 1984). The defendant in
Cook, in an apparent attempt to avoid taxation on the appreciation in value of a sum of
money he controlled as a trustee, withdrew approximately $95,000 from a financial institution
and deposited the money in his personal checking account. Later, the defendant withdrew
sums under $10,000 from the checking account to avoid the Bank Secrecy Act's reporting
requirements until a total of $90,000 in cash was withdrawn. The defendant attempted to
deposit the $90,000 into a new account under a false name and social security number. The
financial institution, however, refused to accept the large sum of cash from the defendant.
Instead, the financial institution demanded a cashier's check from a larger bank. As a result,
the defendant purchased a cashier's check using a false name and caused an inaccurate CTR
to be filed. The court found Cook guilty as a principal of violating the Bank Secrecy Act. As
a principal, Cook willfully caused the bank not to file an accurate report. Id. at 1315.
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Under the second theory, defendants were charged with concealing
a material fact from a regulatory agency. 0 Concealment required the
showing of two elements.51 First, the defendant must have knowingly
and willfully concealed a material fact.52 Second, the defendant must
have been under a duty to disclose the material fact at the time it
was concealed.53 Some federal courts held that conducting transac-
tions under $10,000 to avoid the reporting requirements amounted
to a knowing and willing concealment of a material fact.5 4 In addition,
courts created a duty for individuals.55 This duty was derived from
the duty of the financial institution to report currency transactions
under the Bank Secrecy Act.5 6 Individuals were obligated to disclose
the true nature of their transaction to the bank so that. the bank
could fulfill the duty of filing accurate reports. Under both theories,
50. See, e.g., United States v. Tobon-Builles, 706 F.2d 1092, 1101 (11th Cir. 1983)
(defendant was convicted of concealing a material fact from the government for causing a
bank not to file a required report by purchasing cashier's checks for amounts under $10,000).
The purpose of prohibiting the concealment of a material fact is to prevent the use of deceptive
practices intended to frustrate or impede the authorized functions of the government. United
States v. Shanks, 608 F.2d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1979).
51. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (west 1976) The statute provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device, a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
Id.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir. 1963) (defendants were
prosecuted for making false representations concerning allegedly sham marriages).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 678 (10th Cir. 1981) (conviction for
making false statement in a grant application to the Economic Development Administration
reversed for failure to prove defendant had a duty to disclose the facts at the time of alleged
concealment).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Tobon-Builles, 706 F.2d 1092, 1096 (lth Cir. 1983)
(upholding conviction of defendant charged with causing a bank not to file a report).
55. See id. at 1101. In Tobon-Builles, the defendant and an accomplice engaged in 21
transactions involving 11 different financial institutions. The transactions were for cash
purchases of cashier's checks which totaled $185,200. Each individual transaction, however,
was less than the $10,000 that would have triggered the requirement to file a report under the
Bank Secrecy Act. The court held that as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), Tobon-Builles
had a duty under the Bank Secrecy Act to inform the banks of the structured transactions.
The court went on to hold that the criminal intent of Tobon-Builles as a principal under §
2(b) of Title 18 to cause a concealment, together with the duty and failure of the financial
institution to file a required CTR, constituted the elements of concealment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001. The court reasoned that to allow Tobon-Builles to escape liability would amount to
condoning deceptive schemes designed to deprive the Department of Treasury of valuable
information contained in the CTR's. The court concluded that the actions of Tobon-Builles
were the type of deceptive activity that section 1001 was intended to prevent. Tobon-Builles,
706 F.2d at 1101.
56. See Tobon-Builles, 706 F.2d at 1101.
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the government was forced to resort to a creative use of existing
law. Other appellate courts, however, rejected the use of these
theories .5 7
B. Reversing Convictions of Individuals
Some appellate courts rejected the theories of individual liability
on constitutional grounds.5 8 The courts relied first on the settled
maxim of strict construction:5 9 criminal laws are to be given their
plain meaning 0 In applying this principle, the courts concluded that
the Bank Secrecy Act could not reach individuals. 61 The plain meaning
of the Bank Secrecy Act requires reports for transactions over $10,000
to be filed by financial institutions. 62 Thus, an individual who con-
57. See United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682 (lst Cir. 1985) (reporting require-
ments of Bank Secrecy Act imposed no duty upon individuals to apprise the bank of structured
transactions); United States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986) (reporting requirements
of Bank Secrecy Act imposed no duty upon individuals to apprise the bank of structured
transactions).
58. See Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 682 (subjecting defendant to criminal liability would violate
fifth amendment due process); see also Varbel, 780 F.2d at 762 (subjecting defendant to
criminal liability would violate fifth amendment due process). In Anzalone, the defendant
purchased several cashier's checks in amounts under $10,000 and was convicted at the trial
level for concealing a material fact. Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 682. See supra text accompanying
notes 50-56 (discussing concealment of material fact). The appellate court reversed the convic-
tion. Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 682. The court concluded that the defendant had no duty to
report personal transactions because neither the Bank Secrecy Act nor the regulations of the
Secretary required disclosure of currency transactions for individuals. Id. In Varbel, the
defendant was an attorney suspected of engaging in laundering activities. The defendant was
approached in a "sting" operation by an FBI agent and a government informant. Varbel and
a fellow attorney also charged in the indictment advised the FBI agent to set up an off-shore
bank to launder his supposed proceeds from selling cocaine. The FBI agent was introduced to
an official of a firm representing off-shore banks. This official eventually transferred cashier's
checks to the off-shore bank set up to launder the supposed drug money. The official purchased
cashier's checks in amounts less than $10,000 to avoid the reporting requirements of the Bank
Secrecy Act. The appellate court reversed the conviction of concealment of a material fact
because such a charge depends on finding a duty for the individual to disclose the structured
transaction. The court found that the Bank Secrecy Act imposed no such duty. Varbel, 780
F.2d at 762.
59. See, e.g., Varbel, 780 F.2d at 761. The court in Varbel noted that when the 'language
of an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or
impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the
meaning intended."' Id. (quoting United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278
(1929)). The rationale for this rule is two-fold. First, by giving the law plain meaning it is
more likely that a majority of citizens will have been warned of and will have understood the
law. Second, defining criminal activity is the function of the legislature and not the judiciary.
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
60. See Varbel, 780 F.2d at 761.
61. See, e.g., id. 780 F.2d at 761-62 (reversing conviction of individual defendant under
the Bank Secrecy Act).
62. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1986). See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also Varbel,
780 F.2d at 762.
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ducts a transaction in an amount less than $10,000 cannot be said
to have committed a crime.63
A second theory used in rejecting criminal liability for individuals
relied on the Due Process Clause. 4 The Due Process Clause of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution
requires all criminal laws to define the prohibited activity with
sufficient clarity so that the ordinary person will understand exactly
what conduct is illegal.65 A law is unconstitutionally vague if the law
forces persons to guess as to the meaning. 6 Some courts determined
that persons accused of structuring transactions to avoid reporting
requirements had not been given adequate notice that structured
transactions were proscribed.6 7 Nothing in the statute, regulations, or
legislative history indicated that individuals were obliged to report
structured transactions.6
A third reason used by courts to reject criminal liability for
individuals was based on the separation of powers doctrine. 69 Some
courts reasoned that construing the Bank Secrecy Act in a manner
broad enough to encompass individuals risked upsetting the balance
of governmental powers. 70 Imposing liability upon individuals essen-
tially represented a function reserved for the legislature-defining
criminal activity. 7'
The direct split among appellate courts on the issue of individual
liability under the Bank Secrecy Act made the inadequacy of the
legislation evident. The constitutional issues raised by some courts
63. See Varbel, 780 F.2d at 762. (conviction of individual was reversed upon finding no
duty to report the structured nature of transactions).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682 (Ist Cir. 1985) (using a
constitutional analysis to reverse the conviction of an individual defendant). See also U.S.
CotsT. amend. V. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." Id.
65. See, e.g., Connolly v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (the void-for-
vagueness doctrine under the fourteenth amendment invalidates any criminal statute that is so
unclear that reasonable persons would differ as to the meaning).
66. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974) (legislatures are required to set forth
penal laws in clear language so that enforcement of such laws will not become arbitrary or
discriminatory).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1985) (the regulations
as written would not have served to put the reasonable individual on notice that they were
charged with a reporting duty).
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., id. at 682 n.13 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-
95 (1978) for the proposition that the separation of powers doctrine is fundamental to our
constitutional system). In interpreting a statute the judiciary is not to encroach upon rulemaking
authority of the legislative branch.
70. See, e.g., id. at 682 n.13.
71. See id.
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forced Congress to recognize the limitations of the Bank Secrecy Act
and to enact legislation aimed specifically at individual money laun-
derers.
THm MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL ACT OF 1986
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 increases the ability
of the government to prosecute money launderers. The new legislation
creates two substantive money laundering offenses, and also prohibits
splitting currency transactions into amounts less than $10,000 to
avoid reporting requirements. 72 The Control Act provides civil and
criminal forfeiture for violation of the new substantive crimes. 71
A. New Substantive Crimes
The Control Act creates a substantive crime of money laundering. 74
A person may not knowingly conduct financial transactions with
proceeds of an unlawful activity or transport certain funds into or
out of the United States.75 Funds made with the intent of promoting
72. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1956, 1957 (West Supp. 1987). Section 1956 provides:
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct
such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity-
(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or
the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law ....
Id.
Section 1957 provides: "[W]hoever .. .knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a
monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000
and is derived from specified unlawful activity shall be punished ..... " Id. See 31 U.S.C. §
5324 (West Supp. 1987). Section 5324 provides that no person shall be permitted to cause a
financial institution to not file a required currency transaction report, or to file an inaccurate
report. Structuring a transaction is also prohibited. Id.
73. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 981(a)(1)(C), 982 (West Supp. 1987). Any property gained in
violation of the money laundering offense or structuring offense is subject to forfeiture in
civil or criminal proceedings. Id. The Control Act also changes existing law in four ways: (I)
The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 is amended, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3403(c), 3413(i) (West
Supp. 1987); (2) summons power is granted to the Secretary of Treasury, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(Wvest Supp. 1987); (3) Bank Secrecy Act compliance provisions are enacted, 12 U.S.C.A. §§
1818, 1464(d), 1730, 1786, 18170), 1730(q) (West Supp. 1987); and (4) civil and criminal
penalties for violation of the Bank Secrecy Act are increased, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1987).
74. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (Vest Supp. 1987) (creating a substantive money
laundering offense) with 31 U.S.C.A. H 5311-5323 (Vest 1983), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. §§
5311-5324 (West Supp. 1987) (no substantive money laundering offenses existed under the
Bank Secrecy Act before being amended by the Control Act).
75. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1987).
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an unlawful activity or those designed to conceal unlawful proceeds
are prohibited. 76 A transaction or transportation of funds designed
to evade the transaction reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy
Act is also prohibited. 77
To be guilty of money laundering, the defendant must have knowl-
edge that the property involved in a transaction was derived from
an unlawful activity.78 The defendant need not know the exact origin
of the proceeds. 79 For the purposes of the Control Act, unlawful
activity means a felony under state or federal law. s0 The penalties
for the money laundering offense provide a fine of $500,000 or twice
the value of the funds involved, whichever is greater, imprisonment
of up to twenty years, or both .8 In addition, any property involved
in a prohibited transaction may be forfeited to the United States
government. 8
2
A second related offense prohibits anyone from knowingly engag-
ing in a transaction that involves criminally derived property valued
at more than $10,000.83 The penalties provided for this offense include
jail sentences of up to ten years, applicable fines under Title 18 of
the United States Code, or both.8 4 Any property involved in a
76. Id. § 1956(a).
77. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 28-43 (for discussion of the Bank Secrecy Act).
78. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (requiring that the defendant know that
the property in a transaction represents illegal proceeds).
79. Id.
80. See id. § 1956(c)(7) (definition of unlawful activity). Transaction is defined to include
a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, deposit, withdrawal, account transfer,
currency exchange, credit extention, purchase or sale of stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or
any other monetary deposit; any payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial
institution. Id. § 1956(c)(3). Financial transaction means an exchange involving the movement
of funds or that involves one or more monetary instruments. Id. § 1956(c)(4). The transaction
or financial institution through which the transaction is conducted must affect interstate or
foreign commerce. Id. § 1956(c)(4).
81. Id. § 1956(a)(1).
82. Id. §§ 981-982. Property forfeited under this provision is deemed to vest in the United
States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture. Id. § 981(0 (West Supp. 1987).
An exemption to forfeiture applies to property of third party owners or lienholders who did
not have knowledge that the property was criminally derived. Id. § 981(a)(2) (West Supp.
1987).
83. Id. § 1957 (West Supp. 1987). The statute provides in pertinent part: "Whoever ...
knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived
property that is of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity,
shall be punished ...... Id. Criminally derived property is defined as proceeds, or the property
derived from such proceeds, obtained from a criminal offense. Id. § 1957(0(2). Compare id.
§ 1957 (proscribing transactions in which a party to the transaction has knowledge that the
money is tainted) with id. § 1956 (West Supp. 1987) (concerning transactions entered into for
the purpose of concealing illegal proceeds).
84. Id. § 1957(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987). See infra text accompanying notes 98-139 (dis-
cussing the constitutional infirmities of 18 U.S.C. § 1957).
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transaction that is prohibited by this section is also subject to
forfeiture. 85
B. Changes in Reporting Requirements
Penalties for violating the reporting requirements under the Bank
Secrecy Act are no longer reserved exclusively for financial institu-
tions.86 Under the Control Act, individuals, in their status as cus-
tomers, may be charged with causing a financial institution not to
file a report. 87 The structuring of currency transactions to cause a
report to not be filed or to cause the filing of an inaccurate report
is now criminal. 88 The new section appears to alleviate the prosecuting
difficulties experienced in the recent cases of United States v.
Anzalone&9 and United States v. Varbel.90 In both Anzalone and
Varbel the courts reversed convictions of defendants charged with
structuring transactions. 9' The reversals were based on an absence of
clear and sufficient legislative notice that the conduct constituted a
crime.Y The Control Act sets out explicit language making structuring
of transactions criminal. 93
In addition, under Title 31 of the United States Code and corre-
sponding federal regulations, civil penalties for willful violations of
Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements may be imposed. 94 The
Control Act increases the civil penalty from $10,000 to $25,000.11
The new legislation also strengthens the Bank Secrecy Act by creating
a civil penalty for negligence. 96 Any financial institution that negli-
gently violates a Bank Secrecy Act provision may now be fined up
to $500. 97
85. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 981-982 (West Supp. 1987).
86. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (West Supp. 1987). The statute prohibits any person from causing
a financial institution to not file a required report or to file a report containing an omission
or material misstatement. The structuring of any transaction is also prohibited. Id.
87. Id. § 5324. See supra text accompanying notes 44-71 (discussion of cases illustrating
different money laundering schemes used to avoid triggering reporting requirements).
88. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (West Supp. 1987).
89. 766 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1985).
90. 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986).
91. See supra notes 57-64 (discussing the Anzalone and Varbel decisions).
92. See Anzalone, 766 F.2d at 682; Varbel, 780 F.2d at 762.
93. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5324 (West Supp. 1987).
94. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321 (Vest 1983 & Supp. 1987); 31 C.F.R. § 103.47 (1985). Before
enactment of the Control Act, a willful violator was subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000.
31 C.F.R. § 103.47 (1986). The Control Act increases the penalty to $25,000 or the amount
involved in the violative transaction. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
95. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(a)(1) (vest Supp. 1987).
96. Id. § 5321(a)(6) (authorizing the Secretary of Treasury to impose a negligence penalty).
97. Id.
184
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POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CONTROL ACT
By enacting the Control Act, Congress increased the authority of
law enforcement agencies to combat money laundering. 98 Some pro-
visions of the Control Act, however, contain broad language that
could impact other legitimate activities. 99 What is perhaps most
controversial is the ramification the Control Act has on criminal
defense lawyers.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1957,100 the government may be able to pros-
ecute defense attorneys who knowingly accept tainted money from
their clients. The threat of a felony conviction may cause defense
attorneys to be reluctant to take certain cases, implicating the sixth
amendment rights of the accused. 10' To convict a defense attorney
under the new offense, the government must show that the attorney
was engaged in some form of monetary transaction; 0 2 that the
attorney knew the property involved was obtained from a criminal
offense; 103 that the property was in fact derived from an unlawful
activity; 104 and that the property involved in the transaction has a
value of more than $10,000.10-
By accepting payment for services, a defense attorney meets the
first element of engaging in a monetary transaction. 106 In addition,
defense lawyers will seldom be completely without knowledge of the
98. See generally Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-
1367, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADn, m. NEws (100 Stat.) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981,
1956, 1957; 31 U.S.C. § 5324).
99. See, e.g., Cox, More Laws Won't Hamper Drug-Money Launderers, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 7, 1986, at 34, col. 3 (the new regulations represent bureaucratic technicalities that will
have the effect of limiting civil liberties without significantly attacking drug trafficking); Money
Laundering, Bus. WK., Mar. 18, 1985, at 74, 78 (quoting criticism of the notion that the
bank industry should have to serve a policing function for the government). Regulations viewed
as burdensome are: (1) negligence penalties enacted by the Control Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §
5321(a)(6) (vest Supp. 1987); (2) increase of civil and criminal penalties for not following
reporting requirements, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987); and (3) enactment of
stricter measures for guaranteeing bank compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1818 (vest Supp. 1987).
100. The pertinent language of section 1957 provides: "Whoever ... knowingly engages
or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a
value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished
.... "18 U.S.C.A. § 1957 (,Vest Supp. 1987).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 110-39 (discussing constitutional problems with the
Control Act).
102. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(f)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (definition of monetary transaction).
103. See id. § 1957(a) (providing a knowledge element).
104. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (list of unlawful activities).
105. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (West Supp. 1987).
106. See id.
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guilt or innocence of a client. By virtue of the attorney-client rela-
tionship, the attorney has access to the confidences of the client. 107
As a result, the attorney may have knowledge that the attorney fees
came from an illegal source. In addition, fees for complex drug cases
often run over the $10,000 statutory limit. 08 Theoretically, a criminal
defense attorney would violate section 1957 and would face serious
criminal sanctions. 109
The threat of criminal sanctions under the Control Act seriously
implicates the constitutional rights of the defendant. A criminal
107. See id. See also FED. R. EvrD. 501 (provision for privileges under the Federal Rules
of Evidence); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (purpose of attorney-
client privilege is to foster frank communication between the attorney and client). The defense
attorney can also arguably be shown to have known of the illegal origin of the fee by nature
of the charges against the defendant. In the analogous situation of fee forfeiture, the court in
United States v. Bassett recognized that an attorney will seldom be without knowledge that
an attorney fee might be tainted. United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (D. Md.
1986). See also United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985) (a person
with knowledge of the nature of an indictment is reasonably on notice that the property
transferred might be subject to forfeiture); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985,
605 F. Supp. 839, 849-50 n.14 (S.D.N.Y), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (1985) (the
indictment gives notice to the attorney that the defendant's assets are subject to forfeiture).
108. WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1986, at 39, col. 4. An established lawyer in Miami for a drug
case receives fees of $10,000 at a minimum. Complex cases often exceed $100,000. Id. Attorney
fees for representing Carlos Lehder, the alleged Colombian drug kingpin, are predicted by
some to be as high as $3 million. NVAa ST. J., Feb. 10, 1987, at 41, col. 4.
109. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (penalties for violating § 1957). In
addition to these penalties the attorney fee could be seized pursuant to the forfeiture provisions
of the Control Act. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 981, 982 (West Supp. 1987). These provisions state that
any property directly or indirectly obtained in violation of a substantive offense is subject to
forfeiture. Attorney fees could qualify as forfeitable property under the definition of the
statute. Id. Moreover, under the Control Act, courts may allow prosecutors to seek pretrial
restraining orders to stall payment of legal fees until the outcome of trial is known. Id. This
is done to prevent the transfer of property connected with a violative transaction. United
States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (restraining order enjoining defendant
from transferring assets potentially subject to forfeiture under RICO statutes is not a prede-
termination of guilt and does not violate right to counsel or due process of law). Contra
United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (D. Md. 1986) (to allow attorney fees to be
forfeited under RICO forfeiture provisions would be a violation of the sixth amendment); see
supra note 106 (discussing United States v. Bassett). Cf. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West Supp.
1987) (forfeiture provisions under RICO); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (West Supp. 1987) (forfeiture
provisions under Comprehensive Crime Control Act). The theory used in granting restraining
orders involves use of a statutory relation back doctrine. In a key section of the forfeiture
provision under the new Control Act, any property connected with a violative transaction vests
in the United States upon commission of the act that gave rise to the forfeiture. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 981(f) (West Supp. 1987). Consequently, even though assets may be legitimately transferred
before conviction, such assets are deemed property of the government upon conviction. To
this degree, some courts have enjoined any transfers until the outcome of the trial. See, e.g.,
Bello, 470 F. Supp. at 724-25. Note, however, that under both RICO and the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act there exist provisions specifically allowing for pretrial restraining orders.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(e) (West Supp. 1987); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(e) (West Supp. 1987).
Although the Control Act contains a forfeiture provision in which property is deemed to vest
at the time of the offense giving rise to forfeiture, no restraining order provision appears. See
18 U.S.C.A. § 981, 982 (West Supp. 1987).
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defense attorney may be unwilling to represent certain criminal
defendants because of the criminal penalties. This chills the sixth
amendment right of the defendant to retain counsel of choice. In
addition, empowering government attorneys with a means of prose-
cuting defense lawyers upsets the adversarial process.
A. Chilling Sixth Amendment Rights
The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
counsel.110 Implicit within this guarantee is the right to retain counsel
of choice.' Provided the defendant has the resources to pay, the
government generally cannot disturb the choice of the defendant." 2
The broad language of the Control Act could potentially restrict the
ability of an individual to select counsel.1 3 In view of serious criminal
penalties under the Control Act, criminal defense attorneys may be
reluctant to represent clients charged with certain crimes. To illustrate
this point it is useful to consider an analogous situation involving
110. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to have Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See
also Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (right to counsel in felony proceedings
incorporated through the fourteenth amendment to apply to states).
111. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (defendant should be afforded
fair opportunity to retain counsel of choice); United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801 (6th
Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984) (right to counsel of choice
is an "essential component of the Sixth Amendment"); United States v. Cunningham, 672
F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1982) (right to counsel of one's choice is a right of "constitutional
dimension"); United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1075 (1979) ("courts are afforded little leeway in interfering with [choice of counsel]"); United
States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979)
("[a]n accused who is financially able to retain counsel must not be deprived of the opportunity
to do so"); United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 1969) (the defendant's choice
of retained counsel "should not unnecessarily be obstructed by the court").
112. Cf. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162
(1982) (recognizing that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute and must be balanced
against judicial efficiency).
113. See generally Chambers, Criminal Lawyers in Study Say New Laws Inhibited Case
Choices, N.Y. Tnms, Nov. 21, 1985, at A20, col. 1. When surveyed, many criminal defense
lawyers said they may refuse to accept certain cases because of federal laws allowing the
Government to seize the defendant's assets, including attorney fees already transferred. The
forfeiture provisions referred to in the survey are part of RICO and the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act. Id. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West Supp. 1987) (forfeiture provisions under
RICO); 18 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (West Supp. 1987) (forfeiture provisions under Comprehensive
Crime Control Act). See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing forfeiture under
the Control Act). A plausible argument can be made in connection with the survey reported
in the New York Times that if criminal defense lawyers are reluctant to take cases because of
the possibility of fee forfeiture, they would likewise be reluctant in the face of criminal
sanctions. See Chambers, Criminal Lawyers Say New Laws Inhibited Case Choices, N.Y.
Tnms, Nov. 21, 1985, at A20, col. 1.
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attorney fee forfeiture under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act.1 4
The defendants in United States v. Bassett were charged with
conducting a continuing criminal enterprise in connection with pos-
sessing and distributing heroin." 5 In conjunction with this charge,
the government sought forfeiture of the legal fees paid by the
defendants to their retained counsel." 6 The defendants challenged the
forfeiture and asked the court to exemit the legal fees. 1 7 Invoking
a sixth amendment analysis, the court granted defendants' motion."'
The Bassett court recognized the practical effect a forfeiture pro-
vision would have if applied to legal fees."19 The provision would
impede the ability of defendants to hire counsel of their choice. 20
Although forfeiture of an asset does not technically occur until
conviction, the practical effect is felt by defendants at the time of
seeking counsel.' 2' The Bassett court agreed with the hypothesis that
private defense attorneys would naturally hesitate before accepting a
case in which a fee legitimately earned would likely be forfeited to
the government.'2
The same conclusion must be drawn with respect to the Control
Act. If defense lawyers are reluctant to take cases subject to fee
forfeiture, they will also be reluctant in the face of serious criminal
penalties.1'1 The threat of a felony charge under the Control Act will
114. See United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986). See also 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 853 (West Supp. 1987) (criminal forfeiture provision under the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act).
115. See Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1309. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1981 and Supp.
1987) (continuing criminal enterprise offense).
116. See Basset, 632 F. Supp. at 1309 (the government argued that 21 U.S.C. § 853(c)
should be interpreted so that the forfeiture penalty would apply to attorney fees).
117. See id. at 1309.
118. See id. at 1318. Cf. United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1326-27 (8th Cir. 1985)
(restraining order precluding transfer of assets of defendant and severely hampering ability of
defendant to pay chosen counsel did not violate right to counsel of choice, when appointed
counsel provided sufficient representation). The law in the area of attorney fee forfeiture is
unsettled. See generally The Forfeiture of Attorney Fees in Criminal Cases: A Call For
Immediate Remedial Action, 41 REc. A. BAR N.Y. CIny 469 (1986) (proposing that forfeiture
provisions not apply to attorneys actively representing criminal defendants); Brickey, Forfeiture
of Attorney Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA.
L. REv. 493, 540-42 (1986) (forfeiture provisions appropriately apply to attorney fees and do
not jeopardize the rights of defendants under the sixth amendment).
119. See Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1316 (the impact would be felt prior to conviction).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1317 (quoting United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.DN.Y.
1985)). The guarantee of right to counsel would be eliminated if forfeiture applied to attorney
fees. Id.
123. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (penalties consist of a fine under 18
U.S.C., 10 years imprisonment, or both).
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impair the constitutional right of the criminal defendant to select
counsel, just as the threat of fee forfeiture was held to do in Bassett.124
B. Balance of Adversarial Process
In addition to chilling the accused's ability to retain counsel,
criminal sanctions under the Control Act may upset the balance of
the adversarial system. The court in United States v. Rogers stressed
the importance of a balanced adversarial system.1 25 The defendants
in Rogers were prosecuted under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations statutes (RICO). 126 Government attorneys sought
the forfeiture of legal fees paid to defense counsel.127 The government
moved for a restraining order enjoining defendants from transferring
any assets potentially subject to forfeiture.'2 The Rogers court did
not grant the restraining order, and concluded that attorney fees
transferred at arms length between client and attorney could not be
forfeited. 29
The court in Rogers relied in part on a due process theory. 130 Once
the government blocks transfer of funds, the defendant is disadvan-
taged in preparing a defense.'3 ' An attorney may be reluctant to
124. See Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1315.
125. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349-50 (D. Colo. 1985).
126. Defendants were indicted for mail fraud, racketeering, fraudulent interstate transac-
tions, aiding the filing of false tax returns, conspiring to obstruct justice, and perjury. Id. at
1334. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961-1968 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987). RICO was enacted to attack
organized crime activities and to prevent proceeds of organized crime from infiltrating legitimate
businesses. United States v. Forsythe, 429 F. Supp. 715, 720 (W.D. Pa. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 560 F.2d 1127 (3d Cir. 1977). Forfeiture provisions contained in the RICO statutes
are similar to those of the Control Act. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a) (West Supp. 1987)
(subjecting to forfeiture any property interest connected with violation of RICO) with 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 981, 982 (West Supp. 1987) (subjecting to forfeiture the amount of money
represented in the illegal transaction).
127. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1334.
128. See id. Under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e) provides that a restraining order may be
entered by the court upon a showing that the government is likely to prevail on the issue of
forfeiture and that there is a need to preserve the property. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(e) (West
Supp. 1987). See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(e) (West Supp. 1987) (similar provision under the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act). The Control Act does not contain a similar provision
relating to restraining orders. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 981, 982 (West Supp. 1987).
129. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1346 (neither the indictment nor the motion for injunction
provided sufficient information to indicate probability of forfeiture conviction).
130. Id. at 1349-50. The Rogers court denied the restraining order for other reasons. First
the court analyzed the intent of the legislature and concluded that attorney fees were not
meant to be forfeited under the statute because the transfer of fees was not part of a scheme
to avoid forfeiture. Id. at 1347. Second, hearings conducted to discover fee arrangements
would violate the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 1349.
131. See id. at 1349.
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represent a particular defendant due to the threat of fee forfeiture. 32
In this way, the government is able to interfere with the manner in
which the defendant wishes to conduct the defense.133 The Rogers
court thus determined that fee forfeiture is inconsistent with the
premise of an adversarial system.3 4
Under the Control Act, the government enjoys a more direct
tactical advantage. Rather than deterring defense lawyers by attaching
forfeiture charges to the indictment of the client, the government
can now send an indictment directly to the attorney. 135 This tactic
promises a more serious threat to the adversary system than does fee
forfeiture. The government theoretically possesses the authority under
the new law to send their most formidable competition to jail.' 36
Further, the attorney can only be charged under the new law if
attorney fees exceed $10,000.137 This statutory limit indicates that 18
U.S.C. § 1957 will apply in complex criminal cases.' 38 A defendant
charged with a serious offense will likely prefer the representation
of a lawyer with expertise in complex criminal litigation. If an expert
defense lawyer is deterred from accepting a case because of the threat
of criminal sanctions under the Control Act, the government achieves
an unfair advantage. While private defense attorneys hesitate to take
on complex cases, the government stands ready with sufficient re-
sources to mount a thorough prosecution. 39
132. See id. See also supra text accompanying notes 110-13 (constitutional right to counsel
of choice).
133. See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (the Court stressed the
importance of individual will in deciding how best to conduct a defense).
134. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349-50. See also Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209
(6th Cir. 1981). The Perini court recognized that the cornerstone of the adversary system is
the right of the defendant to counsel of choice and the ability to develop a relationship of
trust and confidence with counsel. Id. See generally Goodpaster, The Adversary System
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REv. oF L. &
Soc. CHANGE 59, 68-72 (1986). Four purposes for the adversarial system are proposed: (1)
truth-finding, (2) fair decisionmaking, (3) enforcing rights, and (4) producing publicly acceptable
conclusions that project substantive legal norms. Id.
135. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (West Supp. 1987) ("Whoever" may include defense
attorneys).
136. See id. § 1957(b) (penalties include applicable fines under 18 U.S.C., 10 years
imprisonment, or both).
137. See id. § 1957(a).
138. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985) (defending
RICO charges depends on vast resources and expertise, which often cannot be provided without
the assistance of private counsel). See generally WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1986, at 39, col. 4
(established private defense lawyers charge over $10,000 for complex drug cases).
139. See generally Krieger & Van Dusen, The Lawyer, the Client and the New Law, 22
Am. CumI. L. REv. 737, 739-40 (1984) (arguing that an appointed public defender cannot serve
as an adequate replacement for private defense counsel because public defenders lack the
1987 / Money Laundering
PROPOSAL
The policy behind 18 U.S.C. § 1957 is legitimate: people should
not be allowed to live off the proceeds of crime. 140 In addition, a
third party is under a duty not to accept money known to be
tainted.14  Further, the criminal defense bar cannot claim immunity
from operation of the law. Sixth amendment concerns complicate
the issue, however, when criminal defense lawyers are involved. A
balance should thus be struck that accommodates both the policy
behind 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and the sixth amendment concerns.
One solution is to amend 18 U.S.C. § 1957 by adding an exception
to the general application of the statute. The penalty for violating
section 1957 should be reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor
specifically for criminal defense attorneys. 42 This change will decrease
the potential for chilling the accused's right to counsel of choice.143
Second, defense attorneys who are actively representing a criminal
defendant should not be subject to liability under section 1957 if the
attorney fee transferred was earned in exchange for actual services
rendered. While not materially altering the Control Act, these changes
would serve to hold intact the sixth amendment rights of the accused
while not undermining the policy reasons behind section 1957.
CONCLUSION
This comment has discussed the problem of money laundering and
the steps taken by Congress through the Bank Secrecy Act and the
newly enacted Money Laundering Act to detect and control money
resources required for elaborate criminal litigation); Tarlow, RICO Report, TIm CATPIoN,
June 1985, at 39, 41 (arguing that public defenders are not a realistic alternative in the context
of complex criminal cases).
140. See WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1986, at 39, col. 4 (quoting one United States Justice
Department official as saying: "[Attorneys] have no right to knowingly live off the fruits of
illegal activities any more than any other citizen does.").
141. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(a) (vest Supp. 1987).
142. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1957(b) (West Supp. 1987) (penalties include applicable fines under
18 U.S.C., imprisonment up to 10 years, or both).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 106-24 (right to counsel of choice). Although this
change may still deter some attorneys from accepting certain cases, a less drastic penalty should
lessen the potential for hesitancy. In addition, conviction for a misdemeanor may not be
grounds for disbarment in some jurisdictions. See MODEL CODE OF PROmssIoNAL REsPoNsmLrrY
DR 1-102(5) (1979) (prohibiting lawyers from engaging in illegal conduct involving moral
turpitude). See generally Note, Disbarment: Non-Professional Conduct Demonstrating Unfitness
to Practice 43 CoRm L.Q. 489 (1958) (discussing moral turpitude and the distinction between
felony convictions and misdemeanor convictions as grounds for disbarment).
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laundering. The provisions of the original act, the Bank Secrecy Act,
were circumvented by individuals who structured their transactions
to avoid the reporting requirements. Several federal courts of appeal
upheld the convictions of individuals engaged in these structured
transactions by finding a duty on the part of individuals to inform
financial institutions of their activity. The First and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeal, however, held that any criminal prosecution of
individuals under the Bank Secrecy Act violated the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.
Congress recognized the limitations of the Bank Secrecy Act in
controlling money laundering and the need for additional statutory
authority for prosecuting individuals. Congress responded by enacting
legislation that creates a substantive crime of money laundering.
Although the new legislation should prove effective in curbing money
laundering activities, some of the language contained in the laws is
overly broad. Criminal defense attorneys could be subject to prose-
cution under the new law for accepting attorney fees from their
clients. This comment suggests the applicable provision be amended
to accommodate both the public interest in controlling money laun-
dering activities as well as the sixth amendment rights of the accused.
Mark R. Irvine
Daniel R. King
